Forgotten children: a sociotechnical systems analysis of the 2004 and 2015 forced child labour reports from Indian cottonseed farms

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1 Forgotten children: A socio-technical systems analysis of the 2004 and 2015 forced child labour

reports from Indian cottonseed farms

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12 Abstract

Using a systems analysis approach, the authors analyse forced child labour incidents in Indian 13 cottonseed farms in the years 2003/04 and 2014/15, and explores the role played by human 14 factors in contributing to the illegal use of child labour in the Indian agri-food sector. National 15 policies on labour welfare and rights are reviewed through the case studies used as a lens to 16 17 explore wider issues associated with forced child labour in supply chains. The study highlights the evolution of organised crime in India with regards to the reliance on forced child labour, 18 using the four conceptual dimensions of modern slavery established by the UK Home Office in 19 20 2017. The study does identify limitations and flaws associated with designing policies based on a "work-as-imagined" philosophy and demonstrates how the use of maturity modelling can 21 22 explore how exploitation, corruption and organised crime is framed and can become more formalised over time. 23

24

1. Introduction

Labour standards and welfare of people working in food or textile supply chains is an extrinsic 25 attribute associated with any product. Forced and trafficked child labour has attracted 26 significant global attention (Antonopoulos, Shen and Papanicolaou, 2013) due to increasing 27 consumer interest in appropriate norms and verification measures to ensure that the supply 28 chain consistently meets expected standards. One such verification measure that consumers rely 29 on is the United Nations' (UN) 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations 30 General Assembly, 2015), of which seven have a direct impact on child labour and welfare 31 standards - (1) no poverty; (2) zero hunger; (3) good health and wellbeing; (4) quality 32 education; (5) decent work and economic growth; (6) peace and justice strong institutions; and 33 34 (7) responsible consumption and production.

A significant number of children work within food, textile and feed supply chains in developing 35 countries (Rena, 2009; Nepal and Nepal, 2012; International Programme on the Elimination of 36 Child Labour, 2013). Child labour is defined as "work that deprives children (any person under 37 18) of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to their physical 38 and/or mental development" (Hilowitz et al., 2004, p. 16). The very existence of child labour 39 not only hinders the individual child's educational achievements, but also the quality of the 40 education system available to children in a particular geography (town/village) (Grimsrud, 41 2003; Nepal and Nepal, 2012). Child labour refers to work that: is mentally, physically, socially 42 or morally dangerous and harmful to children; interferes with children's schooling by depriving 43 them of the opportunity to attend school, obliging them to leave school prematurely, or 44 requiring them to attempt to combine school work and excessively long and manual forms of 45 46 labour (International Labour Organization, 1999, no date; Hilowitz et al., 2004). Hence, in this definition, it is not the activity [the action], but the effect of the activity on the child [the 47

consequence] that defines child labour, i.e., whether or not the activity impacts the child's healthor their access to education (Grimsrud, 2003).

Despite public and private policies to the contrary, national and international reports 50 51 and studies identify a wide range of factors contributing to the occurrence of child labour. Firstly, policies against child trafficking rarely focus on the labour exploitation dimension, i.e., 52 although most countries have a legal framework to prosecute (child) labour traffickers, 53 successfully prosecuting traffickers is quite often difficult to achieve (Smit, 2011). The overall 54 aim of this paper is to analyse the child labour incidents in Indian cottonseed farms in the years 55 2003-04 and 2014-15 and explore the contributing factors to the use of child labour in the Indian 56 agriculture sector and the role of organised crime groups (OCGs) in the illegal use of child 57 labour. To achieve this, the study has two main objectives: 58

59 1. To apply a systems approach to the 2004 and 2015 reports on the illegal use of child
60 labour and use the Accimap method of systems analysis to analyse the human and
61 systemic issues involved in the use of child labour.

2. To reflect on the similarities and differences in terms of human and systemic factors
that led up to these incidents and shed further light on flaws in private/public policy
adoption in India, the role of OCGs, the appropriate countermeasures to mitigate risk
and potential ways forward to improve public and private policy design in the
agriculture labour sector.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 provides an introduction and Section 2 gives more background on organised crime groups and their engagement with child labour. Section 3 provides geographic context in considering child labour issues in India. Section 4 defines the methodology and section 5 outlines the findings. Section 6 provides the discussion and the paper closes with the conclusion (Section 7).

72

2. Agricultural labour in India

73 Being a less economically developed country (LEDC), foreign trade is the centre of India's growth strategy with a plan for contributing towards 3.5% of the world's exports (Directorate 74 General of Foreign Trade, 2015). Agriculture contributes to approximately 17.5% of the GDP 75 (Deshpande, 2017) and 13.6% of total exports (Directorate General of Foreign Trade, 2015). 76 India's focus on the production of food grains has led to it being a top producer of several crops 77 such as cotton, wheat, sugarcane, rice, and pulses. In 2013 India accounted for 25% of the total 78 quantity of cotton produced in the world, and as a result, is the second highest exporter of cotton 79 (Deshpande, 2017). 80

The agriculture sector not only provides food and raw materials, but also employs nearly half 81 of the country's workforce (Sharath, 2019). In 2009-10, the agriculture sector employed 53% 82 of India's total workforce (Labour Employment and Manpower Division, 2011). From the 2016 83 Farming Statistics report and the 2011 LEM report, it can be inferred that agricultural labourers 84 are employees who work on other's lands for a portion of the year in return for wages for the 85 works performed. The 1955 report by the Government of India classified agricultural labourers 86 into two categories (applicable to-date): (1) attached labourers - labourers who are either 87 verbally contracted or contracted through writing, to work on other farmer households. These 88 89 labourers are not allowed to work on other farms and are contracted to work in both, the homes and farms of their employers. Attached labourers are usually paid in kind (e.g., accommodation 90 and food), and there is a higher prevalence of female and child labour under this category than 91 male . The second category is casual labourers - labourers who are free to work on any farm 92 upon receiving payment for their work. Casual labourers may include small farmers owning 93 94 small land holdings, landless labourers, tenant labourers, and sharecroppers (Government of India, 1955), that are looking for additional supplementary work. 95

96 The agricultural labour sector in India is largely unorganised and socio-economically exploited. 97 This can be witnessed by the government's response to the labour crisis during the first wave 98 of the recent Covid-19 pandemic. Ghosh (2020) states that the most destructive effect of the 99 pandemic is not the result of the disease, but the poverty and hunger it has forced millions of 100 labourers (including agricultural labourers) into as the economy has slowed down across the 101 country.

In recent years, the rural labour market has been undergoing significant changes due to a 102 structural transformation from reliance on traditional sectors (e.g., informal – agriculture) to 103 modern sectors (e.g., formal - industrial) (Chand and Srivastava, 2014). Key reasons for 104 105 agricultural labour to be looking for work outside the agriculture sector is the low wage rate and the lack of support (especially for women) from the government (Chand and Srivastava, 106 2014; Ghosh, 2020). Gulati et al. (2013) suggest that schemes such as the Mahatma Gandhi 107 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) have led to issues such as scarcity 108 and non-availability of hired labour for agricultural operations in India as the focus of such 109 110 schemes is to provide employability in formal sectors. Although providing jobs is not necessarily a negative outcome for the nation's economy, there needs to be a revised scheme in 111 place that ensures steady flow of resource (including labour) to the agriculture sector. 112

While being a nation that relies on agricultural output, policy makers and legislators have seldom included the agriculture sector and its labourers in the design of its policies and laws (Morgan and Olsen, 2015). This has led to the steady weakening of the position for smallholders and agricultural labourers. Archaic and often confusing laws and national policies (as highlighted in Table 1) and lack of support for women and child labour has led to a lack of transparency and accountability within the agricultural labour market, leading to increased instances of forced labour in the Indian agriculture sector (Morgan and Olsen, 2015).

120

3. Organised Crime Groups and their engagement with child labour

An organised criminal group (OCG) is defined by the United Nations Convention against 121 Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, 2003) as being "a structured group of three or more 122 persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or 123 more serious crimes or offences ... in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 124 material benefit." Le (2012) determines that organized crime models in the literature can be 125 126 differentiated in terms of those that consider (a) physical structure and mode of operation (b) those models that focus on illicit activities, economics and enterprise and (c) those models that 127 consider the historical, cultural and social framing of organised crime or alternatively a 128 129 combination of these factors. Some groups operate through historical, cultural, kinship and 130 ethnic connections (Albanese, 2011; Ianni, 1972; Le 2012); with collective values, language and modes of operation (Le 2012). Delap (2001) highlights that household poverty and income 131 instability are factors that influence societies where child work occurs. Child trafficking in itself 132 is an organised activity with financial payments or foregoing of debts often forming a 133 transaction in return for the child as a unit of labour (Schrage & Ewing, 2005). Children who 134 are "trafficked" for forced labour, via intermediaries and agents often known to their families 135 136 are "placed" in exploitative situations (Fitzgibbon, 2003). The United Nations (UN) sustainable 137 development goal (SDG) No.8 is to provide decent work and economic growth for workers all over the world and SDG No.4 provision of quality education for all children (United Nations 138 General Assembly, 2015). Studies link better education systems to lower rates of child labour 139 140 (Rena, 2009; Venkateswarlu, 2015), so child labour challenges delivery of both SDGs.

Hazardous labour standards and forced labour received public attention in 2000, when a report on child trafficking was published in the UK (Hütz-Adams, 2010). Following public demands for social responsibility, food businesses (such as Nestlé) invested heavily in redesigning company policies and signing the Harkin-Engel Protocol in order to prohibit the

worst forms of child labour and child trafficking by 2005 (Chocolate Manufacturers 145 Association, 2001; Hütz-Adams, 2010; Ruehle et al., 2017). Once signed, the agreement 146 deadline was extended to 2008 then to 2010, questioning commitment to the policy. An 147 investigation carried out by Tulane University in 2009 highlighted that less than 5% of the 148 children working in cocoa farms (supplying to Nestlé) had benefited from the agreement 149 (O'Keefe, 2016). Further, a documentary by Mistrati (2010) titled "The Dark Side of 150 151 Chocolate" evidenced continuing existence of child trafficking and forced child labour in cocoa farms supplying Nestlé (Hütz-Adams, 2010; Mistrati and Romano, 2010). This case illustrates 152 the dilemmas involved between policy design and regulation enforcement, market promotion 153 154 and labour protection, public authority and public opinion and the failings of an inadequately 155 designed policy drafted by the Chocolate Manufacturers Association (CMA). The sequence of events which lead to continued child labour despite organisations agreeing to national policies 156 and implementing their own private policies reveals a contested complex sociotechnical 157 dynamic. This includes factors in the local work environments, local cultures, organisations and 158 governments (Hütz-Adams, 2010; Mistrati and Romano, 2010; Ruehle et al., 2017). 159

As well as a lack of vertical interaction (Kirlik, 2011), factors such poverty, inadequate 160 audits, poor communication between stakeholders, inadequate constraints, and value chain 161 complexity influences the use of illegal child labour (International Labour Organization, n.d.; 162 Gayi & Tsowou, 2016; Ruehle et al., 2017; Burea of International Labor Affairs, 2018) leading 163 to a negative supply chain culture (Navak & Waterson, 2016; Pennington, 2009). In India, 40 164 million children are suggested to be working in conditions where they cannot refuse their labour 165 and these children are often trafficked or traded (Srivastava, 2019). There have been studies 166 167 on organised crime in India but they do not focus on child labour (Sharma, 1999; Charles, 2001; Martin & Michelutti, 2017). Child labour in India is now considered in more detail. 168

169

4. Child Labour in India

There are ambiguities in India in employment terms of what constitutes a "child" and 170 "adolescence". The Child Labor Act (1986) dictates that children above the age of 14 can work 171 in family businesses, but not in hazardous industries. However, the Plantations Labor Act 172 (1951) simply defines a child as one younger than 15 years. Adolescence is defined as the age 173 between 15 and 18 in India (Seth, 2013), but between 10 and 19 by the World Health 174 Organisation (United Nations General Assembly, 1989). This ambiguity creates a policy 175 challenge when comparing national and international standards and considering in terms of 176 being *a child* in the Indian context. 177

Child labour influences the local, national and global job market. Non-compliant businesses 178 prefer hiring child labour as: they are paid lesser than adult labourers or are made to work for 179 free; are easier to control and bully; are easier to traffic to work illegally; work longer hours; 180 and are deemed to be protected through the existence of faulty policies (Venkateswarlu, 2004, 181 2015) i.e. they are easier to exploit. Indeed, poorly designed policies aimed at increasing adult 182 participation in labour markets can generate greater demand for child labour (Dammert et al., 183 2018). Utilising child labour reduces adult employment opportunities and associated poverty 184 drives children, especially girls, being sent to work instead of attending school. Unsafe working 185 and living conditions for children on farms impedes physical, social and intellectual growth 186 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2018; Grimsrud, 2003). Further, uneducated children 187 remain trapped in poverty, and this cycle perpetuates with their children as well (Ruehle et al., 188 2017), becoming a vicious cycle. 189

190 4.1 Regulatory approaches to child labour

191 The Government of India (GoI) is divided into 52 ministries/departments, including the 192 Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare (GoI, 2020) which is sub- divided as: the 193 Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers' Welfare (DAC&FW); Department of

Agriculture, Research & Education (DARE); and Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying 194 & Fisheries (DAHD&F). DAC&FW deals with the development and implementation of 195 policies related to agriculture and farmers' welfare in India. The administrative head of the 196 department is the Secretary who is supported by multiple advisors. The DAC&FW has a further 197 27 divisions of which, the Vigilance Division plays a key role in ensuring compliance with 198 policies and protocols in a wide array of policies within the agriculture sector. The Division is 199 involved in: collecting intelligence about corrupt practices committed or likely to be committed 200 by employees of the department; investigating or initiating an investigation into verifiable 201 allegations; processing investigation reports for further consideration of the concerned 202 203 disciplinary authority; referring matters to the Commission for advice where necessary; 204 introducing barriers to help prevent improper practices and misconduct; examining audits; and carrying out inspections from a vigilance perspective. The Vigilance Division works in tandem 205 with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). 206 (DAC&FW, 2019). 207

208 Another key ministry within the GoI responsible for child welfare and rights of child labour is the "Ministry of Labour & Employment". Its main objective is to protect and safeguard 209 the interests of two types of workers: general labourers; and those who constitute the poor, 210 deprived and disadvantaged sections of society. Another objective is to promote the labour 211 force's welfare and social security in both organised and unorganised sectors, in tandem with 212 the process of labour liberalisation. To achieve these objectives, the department enacts and 213 implements various labour laws that regulate the terms and conditions of service and 214 employment for labourers (GoI, 2016). 215

The Constitution of India clearly states that any form of forced labour is prohibited, and that any contravention of this provision is an offence punishable by law (GoI, 2015). There are 44 labour-related statutes enacted by the "Ministry of Labour & Employment" addressing

topics such as: minimum wage; accidental and social security benefits; occupational health and
safety; conditions of employment; disciplinary action; formation of trade unions; and industrial
relations.

222 The work sector in India is divided into two categories: unorganised; and organised. The unorganised work sector comprises of "all unincorporated private enterprises owned by 223 individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services operated 224 225 on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten total workers" (Sengupta et al., 2007, p. 2), of which the agriculture sector is a part. Table 1 highlights statutes enacted by the Central 226 GoI that are relevant to child labour welfare and rights in the agriculture sector. A survey carried 227 228 out by the "National Sample Survey Organization", India in 2017-18 highlighted that the total employment in the unorganised sector amounted to approximately 437 million workers, of 229 which 56.3% worked as labourers in the agriculture sector (National Statistical Office, 2019). 230

231

Take in Table 1

232 The "Ministry of Labour & Employment" and the "Vigilance Division" within the DAC&FW should work in tandem to address labour standards in the agriculture sector, and 233 farmers/contractors comply with various statutes and policies at a meso (business) and micro 234 (individual) level. It is the duty of the vigilance officers and labour inspectors to inspect 235 workplaces relating to conditions of work and protection of workers and provide 236 feedback/advice on how any non-compliance could be avoided in the future. In addition, they 237 also must specify if such advised action is simply good practice or a legal obligation. Inspectors 238 have the authority to inspect records, write informally to correct non-compliance or close a site 239 240 due to breach of regulations. In serious cases, inspectors can recommend prosecution of concerned violators (International Labour Organization, 1947; DAC&FW, 2019). 241

Indian labour welfare public and private policies have considerable design flaws 242 (Venkateswarlu, 2015; Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2018). Changes in Indian 243 agriculture and farming policies have coincided with two major institutional changes: 244 globalisation of the food industry (Navak and Waterson, 2019); and international trade 245 246 liberalisation. Further, economic volatility (International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, 2013); strong competition between transnational and national corporations 247 (Venkateswarlu, 2004, 2015); a lack of regard for, and non-compliance with, public and private 248 child labour policies, as well as inadequate reporting/systems, frame exploitation of child labour 249 in agri-food value chains. 250

251 Additionally, policy makers have an idealistic view of formal tasks leading to a disregard of the need to adjust work to match the constantly evolving conditions of work. This leads to the 252 design of policies based a "work-as-imagined" philosophy – this philosophy describes what 253 should be happening under normal working conditions. This philosophy is based on the success 254 255 of 'Taylor's Principles' as described in the monograph, Scientific Management Theory (Taylor, 256 1911) which prescribes to a detailed breakdown of tasks and activities to improve work 257 efficiency. Safety and welfare were not considered as issues in the monograph. However, it is important for policy makers to design policies based on how work unfolds over time under the 258 259 pressures of the environment, i.e., a "work-as-done" philosophy (Hollnagel et al., 2013). Intractable work environments and pressures of globalisation (Aas, 2007; Nayak and Waterson, 260 2019) have made it difficult for there to be alignment between "work-as-done" and "work-as-261 imagined". Policies (including labour policies) which are designed a "work-as-done" 262 philosophy are of reflective flexible and adaptive systems (Eurocontrol, 2013). Such systems 263 264 allow stakeholders to work around the everyday challenges that they face, while ensuring their welfare and safety. 265

266 *4.2 Summary*

The global consumer base that the Indian agriculture sector supplies are sensitive to issues 267 such as modern-day slavery and the employment of child labour on farms. However, multi-268 level regulations, core disputes about public agricultural and labour policies, and the shifting 269 270 balance between various public and private policies are multiple issues where flaws in Indian food and agricultural policies seem evident. Although labour welfare and rights is an important 271 and a highly salient policy arena, it has been brought into sharp relief in modern-day India 272 (Hilowitz et al., 2004; League of Arab States et al., 2019; Seth, 2013; Srivastava, 2019; 273 Venkateswarlu, 2015). Despite the design of policies that prescribe to an ethical approach of 274 275 "work-as-imagined" by stakeholders (government, business, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) etc.) who are not involved in the day-to-day functioning of the Indian agriculture 276 sector, there is an ethical and operational conflict as these stakeholders may not understand or 277 observe the reality of "work-as-done". Reports on the 2003-04 and 2014-15 child labour 278 occurrences in Indian cottonseed farms show weak regard not only for the International Labour 279 Organisation's (ILO) policy on child labour; but also the Indian regulation and policy on 280 employing child labour (Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986¹) 281 and owning large pieces of land (Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976²) 282 283 (Venkateswarlu, 2004a, 2004b, 2015). The 2004 study reported that 67.2% of the labourers on cottonseed farms in Gujarat (GJ)³ were aged between 8 and 18. In comparison, the 2015 study 284 reported 52.7% of labourers on cottonseed farms in GJ were between the ages of 8 and 18 285 286 (Venkateswarlu, 2015). The use of child labour in this context presents an opportunity for labour exploitation and supply chain corruption worthy of further investigation. 287

¹ Amended as the CLPR Act, 2016.

² Repealed in various states in India.

³ Gujarat is a state on the western coast of India.

288 **5.** Methodology

289

5.1. The Accimap approach

290 The Accimap approach (Rasmussen, 1997) is used in this study to analyse reported incidents of child labour. This approach involves the construction of a multi-layered graphical 291 representation in which the causes of the incidents are arranged according to their causal 292 remoteness from the outcome (Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009). Accimaps adopt a control-293 theory based approach to incident analysis within the context of a socio-technical system 294 (Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). According to this theory, accidents are a 295 296 result of unexpected, uncontrolled relationships between a system's constituent parts where systems are analysed as whole entities instead of considering them as various parts in isolation 297 298 (Underwood and Waterson, 2014; Nayak and Waterson, 2016b). Stakeholders of a complex system interact with a range of factors in their environment, which eventually influences the 299 way they behave. The Accimap method has been used previously to analyse individual 300 301 accidents such as the Überlingen mid-air collision (Branford, 2011) and the 1996 and 2005 E.coli outbreaks in the UK (Nayak and Waterson, 2016b). All work situations leave varying 302 degrees of freedom to the actors so they have the ability to choose the means and times of action 303 even when there is a set of instructions or policies in place to follow (Rasmussen, 1997). 304

The agriculture sector consists of transnational as well as local businesses, and farms – both of which are required to have private policies and standard operating procedures in place for every task – this helps achieve maximum efficiency and makes stakeholders responsible for their actions. However, failure to follow regulations and policies to the letter leads to the occurrence of negative events (Hollnagel, 2014). The Accimap model for food systems highlighted in Figure 1 depicts the control of sociotechnical systems over six basic systemic levels:

Level 1 - Government level: Laws and public policies are developed to control the
 practice of illegal labour practices.

- Level 2 Regulatory bodies and associations: Legislation and public policies are
 adapted at the local ministerial and non-ministerial enforcement body level into industry
 rules and guidelines.
- Level 3 Organisational level: Regulatory body rules and public policies are translated
 into private policies. Organisational protocols and governance structures are organised
 according to these policies.
- Level 4 Management level: Management ensures that the organisation's policy is
 implemented, and that there is a high level of compliance with the policies and
 protocols. In this study management includes large farm owners and middle-men who
 supply labour and contracts to farmers.
- Level 5 Labour level: The labour in the case of this study are tribal and migrant
 labourers who are brought to work seasonally on cotton farms, or are made to work on
 their own loaned-farms as subsistence farmers.
- Level 6 Work, equipment and the environment: The organisation and farm's protocols
 are performed in these environments by labourers. Policies and regulations are
 applicable at every element within this level.
- 329

Take in Figure 1

There are several advantages of adopting the Accimap approach. By making use of graphical 330 331 representation, the Accimap approach provides the context for gaining a comprehensive understanding of how and why an incident occurred (Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009). 332 The graphical representation helps analysts compile large amounts of information into one 333 334 comprehensive diagram by highlighting the multiple causal factors leading to negative events (Jenkins et al., 2010; Nayak and Waterson, 2016a). The Accimap approach aids analysts and 335 incident investigators uncover a diverse set of 'negative incident enabling' factors across the 336 system. This approach highlights that immediate causes of events (e.g., human errors) are the 337

result of higher level factors, thereby, promoting Reason's (2000) systems approach. This 338 approach not only identifies the root cause that led to the incident, but also progressively 339 identifies the causes of each of the factors. By doing so, the Accimap approach helps to identify 340 the decisions, events and conditions that created the environment in which the incident occurred 341 (Branford, 2011). Links between causal factors also helps analysts and investigators evaluate 342 complex interactions between various factors, and design holistic interventions with the 343 potential to have an impact across the entire system under investigation. The term causal factors 344 is used by Branford and so for accuracy has been used in this paper. The term causal is used in 345 the context of being a necessary or contributory factor of influence in a given accident or 346 347 incident but not to imply causality (Branford et al., 2009).

348

5.2. Construction of Accimaps

The steps for Accimap analyses in this study were adapted from the Branford et al. (2009, 349 pp.205-212). The Accimap analyses of the incidents were performed by the first author. The 350 351 analyses and their interpretive findings were then reviewed by the second author. While both 352 individuals are food policy researchers, the first researcher has experience in applying human 353 factors methods to complex sociotechnical systems, and the second researcher has experience of applying socio-economic and cultural theory in agri-food supply chains. Upon completion 354 of the analyses, the researchers exchanged and reviewed outputs, and any anomalies were 355 resolved through discussion until a consensus was reached in a similar to the approach described 356 in Underwood and Waterson (2014). In addition to the standardised approach prescribed by 357 Branford et al. (2009), the modified classification of causal factors recommended by Nayak 358 and Waterson (2016) was used i.e., causal factors were classified as "pre-conditions", "direct 359 360 causes", "indirect causes", "complex causes", and "outcomes." Preconditions are events which either lead to a direct or an indirect cause, but are not causes themselves; direct causes are 361 serious events, which if avoided, would have completely prevented an outcome; indirect causes 362

do not have a straightforward role to play in the consequent outcome, i.e., other causes also contribute to the same outcome; and finally, a complex cause indicates that a cause can be classified as direct as well as indirect as it has had multiple roles to play in the occurrence of a given negative incident e.g. use of illegal child labour.

An in-depth review of The India Committee of the Netherlands reports from 2004 and 2015 was carried out independently by both authors utilising the following approach: construction of a timeline of the events involved in the child labour incidents; identifying causal factors that led to the incidents; identification of the human factors of influence; and considering the systemic levels at which the human factors have influence (see Figure 1). Table 2 highlights the coding used to construct the Accimap and the resulting Accimaps are presented in Figures 2 and 3.

374

Take in Table 2

Implications of the Accimaps developed in this research are presented under subheadings adapted from the conceptual dimensions stated in Cooper *et al.* (2017): recruitment; profit; organisation; and control. Table 3 provides an overview of the four conceptual dimensions, their sub-factors and the maturity stages of each of the dimensions in the 2003/04 and 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents.

380

Take in Table 3

Tables 4 and 5 describe in detail the causal factors identified in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. A comparison of the similarities and differences between the two incidents is provided in the discussion in this paper along with a detailed analysis of the inadequacies of current and past labour policy design in India to provide recommendations for policy.

385 **6. Findings**

Results are considered in terms of each report (Venkateswarlu, 2004; 2015) and findings are highlighted singularly and then compared in Section 6. The maturity of various causal factors for both incidents are highlighted in detail in Table 3.

389

6.1. The 2003/04 Gujarat child labour incidents

Children were used in highly labour-intensive plantations to carry out cross pollination, vital in 390 391 cottonseed production, accounting for approximately 90% of total labour required, and 45% of cultivation costs (Venkateswarlu, 2004). Most farmers relied on hired labour for carrying out 392 daily activities (86.5%), 82.5% being migrant labourers belonging to communities from GJ and 393 Rajasthan and family labour less than 10% of the total. Workers came to find work in GJ due 394 to perennial droughts in Rajasthan. Out of the total hired labour force, two thirds of those 395 working in cottonseed farms were between the ages of 8 and 18; children below the age of 14 396 accounting for 34.9% of the total labour force. The number of girls working was higher than 397 the number of boys (60.9% and 39.1% respectively) as farmers preferred girl children due to 398 399 their "delicate fingers (nimble fingers)" (Assan & Hill, 2011; Singh, 2017; Venkateswarlu, 400 2015, p. 9). The rate of pay was between £0.27 and £0.43 per day. The rate of pay for child labour being at the lower end of the spectrum and paid directly to their parents. These findings 401 402 are consistent with a study on Asian children working as hidden labour in lesser developed areas (Webbink et al., 2012). 403

404

Take in Figure 2 and Table 4

The Accimap analysis is presented in Figure 2. Events such as 'families of migrant labourers forcing their children to work' arising from the 'promise of additional wages', acted as reference points to begin analysis at the 'operational management' and 'organisational' levels. The causal factors show gradual deterioration and failure at various points across the value 409 chain. Factors were assimilated in order to analyse individual factors, factors within a system, 410 and the interactions between various factors throughout the whole system (Nayak and 411 Waterson, 2016b). Iterative analysis meant that the Rasmussen's 1997 model was further 412 divided into two sub-levels at the 'operational management' level – farmers and middle-413 men/labour contractors. Sixteen causal factors (one indirect factor - access to limited resources 414 for farmers) were identified across the operational management level, the most for any level in 415 the Accimap.

416 **6.1.1.** Recruitment

The Accimap reveals that illegal use of child labour was not an outcome of individual non-417 compliances with public and private policies or the inadequacies of public policies alone, but 418 was instead attributable to an accumulation of major factors across multiple systemic levels 419 such as the government's commitment to export, and market demand for illegally produced GM 420 crops. Of all the causal factors identified, 8.7% were recruitment-related factors. Four causal 421 factors were attributable to the recruitment of forced child labour through coercion and deceit. 422 423 These factors were located primarily within the 'operational management' level; three factors identified at 'middle-men providing labour' level, while only one factor was identified at the 424 'labourers' level. No other recruitment-related causal factors were identified in the 2003/04 425 incident. 426

427 6.1.2 Profiteering

Of the causal factors, 26.1% were profiteering-related. Twelve causal factors located across the sociotechnical system were attributable to stakeholders' need for profit. While only one of these factors was at the 'Central Government' level, two were at the 'State Government' level, and three at the 'organisational' level. Five causal factors were identified across the 'operational management' levels; four at the 'farm' level, and one at the 'middle-men providing labour' 433 level. One factor, which can also be classified as an outcome, was attributable to the 'labourers'434 level.

At the government levels (Central and State), 25% of causal factors were linked to the need for 435 436 the nation to generate profits. Out of a total of 12 factors across the two government levels, only 50% had been identified in the 2004 report, the remaining 50% (marked as orange boxes) had 437 to be inferred from other reports (as these were gaps identified through the Accimap analysis), 438 while 75% of the identified factors were categorised as indirect causal factors. Causal factors, 439 that could not be classified into one of the four conceptual dimensions of forced labour, were 440 identified as indirect causes. The missing causal factors were mostly linked to the quality of 441 inspections by government inspectors (failure to audit labour agreements, farms and public 442 schools; inadequate and poor quality of public schools). Another indirect causal factor linked 443 to profiteering was the reallocation of budgets due to monetary restraints at the 'State 444 government' level. The other indirect causal factors identified at the government levels (open 445 competition between states; the Indian Ceiling Act; and inadequate policies) were mentioned 446 447 in the 2004 report as distant causes that could have played a minor contextual role.

At the 'organisational' level 43% of factors such as demand for illegally produced GM hybrids and relocation of business to GJ were attributable to the drive for profits, 28.5% associated with OCGs connected to child labour, while a further 28.5% such as dependency on local labour; were classified as indirect causes. 31% of the factors e.g. illegal production of GM hybrids and reliance on migrant labour identified at the 'operational management' level were linked to profiteering, with a majority (80%) at the 'farming operational management' level.

454 6.1.3 Organisation of criminal activity

455 Of the causal factors identified, 10.9% were organised criminality-related. Four causal factors 456 were attributable to the involvement of OCGs in child labour exploitation focussed across the 457 'organisational' and 'operational management' (at the farm) levels. Casual factors at the 458 organisational level such as agreements with middle-men for hiring farmers were attributable 459 to exploitation while only 12.5% of the factors (need for assured supply of labour; and advanced 460 agreements with labour contractors) were at the 'operational management' farmer level.

461 6.1.4 Control and coercion

462 Around one fifth (19.6%) of causal factors were control-related. Nine causal factors were attributable to stakeholders' need to control and labour exploitation. Five causal factors were 463 located across the 'operational management' levels: (one 'farm' level, and four 'middle-men 464 providing labour' level); and four causal factors were attributable to the 'labourers' level 465 (unregulated working hours; signed generic contracts; sleeping with farm equipment; and no 466 holidays) highlighting failings across the system. The 'labourers' level is similar to the 467 'outcomes' level in Rasmussen's 1997 model. It has been reworded for the purposes of this 468 research as all the final negative outcomes were present at this level. Out of the nine outcomes 469 identified, 44% of the outcomes were control-related, one outcome (families force children to 470 work) was OCG related, another (regular absences from school) was recruitment related, and 471 472 one outcome (illegal use of child labour), profit related. The remaining two outcomes (illiteracy; and no access to own homes) could not be classified into any of the conceptual dimensions of 473 forced labour. 474

475 6.2. The 2014/15 Gujarat child labour incidents

The 2015 report on child labour incidents in GJ was an outcome of media as well as multiple international reports on the continual use of child labour in cottonseed farms in India, and the poor work conditions they work in. The report was produced as an outcome of a collaborative project between: an independent NGO, "The Indian Committee of Netherlands"; a coalition, "Stop Child Labour"; and a multi-disciplinary research and consultancy service, "Global Research". The following details about the incident are adapted from Venkateswarlu (2015).

The research highlighted that children under the age of 14 accounted for 25% of the total 482 workforce in cottonseed farms in India in 2014/15. As in 2003/04, GJ was the country's largest 483 regional producer of cottonseeds and employed 110,000 children (55% of India's child labour 484 on cottonseed farms). The number of children (ages 15-18) working on such farms in GJ was 485 281,200, which was an increase of nearly a half from the number in 2006/07. The report 486 highlighted that cross-pollinators were paid between 6.6% and 16.6% below the national 487 minimum wage in GJ. In addition to working long hours, children working in cottonseed fields 488 were exposed to pesticides which were used in high quantities in cottonseed cultivation. 489 Venkateswarlu (2015) highlights that the governments of GJ (where children were trafficked 490 491 to) and Rajasthan (where children were trafficked from) were in denial about the existence of, 492 and increase in, labour exploitation (between 55% and 58% of the total child workforce in GJ were truant from school). Dropping out of school to migrate with families in search of work is 493 a major survival strategy for many impoverished families in India (Roy et al., 2015). Despite 494 widespread acknowledgement within the seed industry about the existence and exploitation of 495 child labour, only a few multinationals and local seed companies had taken efforts, through 496 private policies, to help eradicate child labour. The Accimap resulting from the review is 497 presented in Figure 3. 498

499

Take in Figure 3 and Table 5

Events such as 'subsistence farmers, funded by seed companies, forcing their children to work' acted as reference points to begin analysis at the 'labourers' and 'organisational' levels. Similar to the analysis carried out in Section 4.1, this analysis highlighted the impact of a complex set of interactions between multiple causal factors distributed across systemic levels leading to the illegal use of child labour in 2014/15 in GJ. The analysis presented in Figure 3 underlines failures at multiple points. Here the farmers' level also consisted of additional stakeholders in the form of local seed producers whose actions caused negative impacts on labourers and their families. Fourteen causal factors were identified across the operational management levels. One indirect factor was identified at this level. A key difference between the Accimaps resulting from both the analyses is that while the 2003/04 incidents had a majority of profiteering-related factors, OCG activity was the most recurring causal factor in the 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents.

512

6.2.1 Organisation of criminal activity

The Accimap (Figure 3) reveals that the illegal use of child labour was not just an outcome of 513 individual non-compliances with public and private policies or the inadequacies of public 514 policies alone, but was instead attributable to an accumulation of events. These included the 515 516 state government's denial of the existence of child labour; intentional miscommunication about the role of child labour by organisations and the state government; trafficking of migrants; and 517 the lack of duty of care for labourers' families. Of all the causal factors identified, 30.8% were 518 attributable to illicit activities. These factors were distributed across the 'Central Government', 519 'State Government', 'organisational', and 'operational management' (labour middle-men) 520 521 levels. 62.5% of the factors at the 'State Government' level were attributable to OCG activity, 522 while only one factor (inadequately designed national policies) at the 'Central Government' level was associated with the presence of organised crime. The common theme across both 523 government levels was the inadequacy of public policies and a lack of commitment to eliminate 524 child labour creating a compromised environment where organised crime could flourish (Shaw, 525 2019). Intentional miscommunication was a causal factor at both, the 'State Government' as 526 well as the 'Organisational' levels; both stakeholders intentionally and falsely reported that 527 children working on family-run subsistence farms to help their parents either during school 528 529 holidays or around school hours. Furthermore, seed companies also made false promises regarding the design of detailed private policies to help eliminate child labour in India. In 530 comparison to the other levels, only 21.4% of the factors at the 'operational management' levels 531

were attributable to organised exploitative behaviour and all of these factors were identified at the labour middle-men level. At the 'farmers and local seed producers' (operational management) level, control and coercion were the predominant causal factors. One outcome at the 'labourers' level was as identified as a form of highly organised OCG activity. Arslan (2020) argues that power inequality is the foundation for such labour exploitation driven by distance (especially for migrant workers), profiteering and oppression.

538 6.2.2 Profiteering

Similar to the 2004 report, only one causal factor (33.3%) attributable to profiteering was 539 identified at the 'Central Government' level. However, unlike the 2004 report, one profiteering-540 related causal factor (16.7%) was also found at the 'external' level. Around a quarter (23.1%) 541 of the causal factors identified in the 2015 illegal child labour report were attributable to 542 profiteering and were located all across the sociotechnical system. At the 'State Government' 543 level there was one causal factor attributable to profiteering. A further two causal factors were 544 identified at the 'organisational' level. Around a third of causal factors (35.7%) attributable to 545 546 profiteering were identified at the 'operational management' levels: one at 'farmers/local seed producers' level, while three were located at the 'labour middle-men' level. A further three 547 outcomes (20%) identified at the 'labourers' levels were also profit-related. 548

549 6.2.3 Control and coercion

Of the causal factors, 12.8% were attributable to control and coercion. One control-related causal factor (12.5%) was at the 'organisational' level; four causal factors (35.7%) at the 'operational management' levels; (two at the 'farmers/local seed producers' level, and two at the 'labour middle-men' level). A further third of outcomes at the 'labourers' level were related to control and coercion. Subsistence farming as a causal factor was unique to the 2014/15 child labour incidents where organisations (seed companies) relocated to specific areas to avoid constant media attention related to child labour as well as loaning farmland to subsistence farmers. Further, local seed producers also loaned out seeds to subsistence farmers with loan agreements that included high interest rates and repayment schemes in the form of product and monetary outputs. Subsistence farmers in-turn had to over-rely on their family (including children) to meet loan terms and produce the desired output. These show examples of supply chain oppression (Arslan, 2020).

562 6.2.4 Recruitment

In the 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents in GJ, only one causal factor (2.5%) was attributable to recruitment, and it was located at the 'labour middle-men' (within the 'operational management') level. However, three (20%) of the outcomes at the 'labourers' level were recruitment-related. Unlike the 2003/04 child labour incidents, causal factors attributable to recruitment in the 2014/15 child labour incidents were mostly focussed at the 'labourers' level.

569 **7. Discussion**

A range of stakeholders play a role in ensuring that the agri-food value chain is compliant with 570 the ILO's policy on child labour (C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 571 182)). Stakeholders of interest here include central and local governments; regulators; senior 572 573 leaders, board of directors and managers of transnational, national and local businesses; farmers; middle-men such as labour suppliers; and labourers. Human factors and by extension, 574 575 a systems approach, emphasizes interactions between people and their environment, and its 576 effect on performance, compliance, degree of safety, quality of work life, services offered, and the means adopted to offer services and products (Carayon et al., 2006). The importance of 577 considering social constructs and interactions between the various elements of complex systems 578 579 while designing policies has also been recommended in the healthcare, political, nuclear and transportation sectors (Branford, 2011; Holden et al., 2013; Nayak & Waterson, 2016; 580 Schneider & Sidney, 2009). Although policies and guidelines are important in developing 581

normative standards, designing a large number of guidelines from multiple sources makes it 582 impossible for stakeholders to comply with them (Carthey et al., 2011). The use of Accimap 583 analysis in this case study has shown the complexity of the causal factors leading to multiple 584 negative outcomes associated with child labour. Similar to the 2003/04 child labour incidents, 585 the causal factors in 2014/15 were linked in linear and downstream patterns. However, the 586 complexity of the factors in the 2014/15 incidents was much greater. The analysis has not only 587 highlighted multiple factors lead to the illegal use of child labour between 2014 and 2015, but 588 also the presence of multiple secondary negative outcomes. These include lack of knowledge; 589 unregulated working hours; increased rates of poverty; violation of national and international 590 591 conventions; no provision of holidays; and non-functioning Workers' Unions. Although these 592 outcomes indirectly lead to the illegal use of child labour, they also have a bigger role in either leading to the overall failure of the system, and also public and private policies meant to protect 593 594 labour and child welfare and rights.

595 The Accimap analysis further establishes that although multiple public and private policies 596 were designed as reactive measures post the 2003/04 child labour incidents, not only did illegal 597 child labour continue, but also that the system and its stakeholders adapted their illegal activities around the findings of the 2004 report. For example, seed companies relocated to remote areas 598 potentially to: avoid media and NGO attention; and bind tribal and poverty-stricken labourers 599 into subsistence farming in return for cheap and bonded labour. This is an example of supply 600 chain oppression and labour exploitation underpinned by an organised approach to the use of 601 child labour. Le (2012) determines that organized crime models have a physical structure and 602 mode of operation that focus on illicit activities, economics and enterprise and they are framed 603 604 by cultural and social factors. It is reported that seed companies exploited poverty-stricken households that relied heavily on child labour (Dammert et al., 2018). Whilst governments, and 605

seed companies designed multiple anti-trafficking policies (based on 'work-as-imagined'), inreality there were poor rates of compliance (with regards to work-as-done).

608

8 7.1. Comparing the maturity of the child labour incidents

609 In order to conceptualise the findings of this study, maturity models (Figures 4 and 5) have been developed based on the findings from the Accimaps (Figures 2 and 3), and the dimensions of 610 modern slavery (Cooper et al., 2017). The four dimensions of modern slavery are in the inner-611 612 most circle, while the penultimate circle highlights the maturity descriptors for each of the dimensions. Each dimension is represented by a different colour: recruitment (orange); control 613 and coercion (yellow); organisation of criminal activity (blue); and profiteering (green). The 614 615 outermost circle illustrates the number of causal factors and outcomes identified at each of the systemic levels, this is then categorised into the relevant maturity stages. The higher the number 616 617 of causal factors and outcomes under each maturity descriptor, the larger the rectangle for each systemic level in the outermost circle. 618

619

Take in Figures 4 and 5

The maturity of both complex systems shows recruitment was between *victims approaching* offenders to offenders targeting very vulnerable victims; profiteering occurs between *limited* financial gain to running like a business; OCG activity sits between minimal organisational to highly organised criminal activity; and control and coercion lies between threats and occasional violence to social isolation with the exception of substance-related coercion. Overall, the cottonseed sector in GJ had matured between 2003 and 2015 with regards to the level of maturity of exploitation and corruption, a cause for concern.

The causal factors associated with the 2003/04 illegal child labour incidents appear more
opportunistic and less coordinated in terms of criminal activity (Manning, Smith & Soon, 2016)
when compared to the 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents. Stakeholders designed policy

630 based on national and international regulations and conventions (legally compliant) without necessarily seeing how to operationalise them in real-world scenarios where it was impractical 631 to implement or inactivate. The 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents, as has been shown in 632 this paper, had an even distribution of causal factors and outcomes between two maturity stages: 633 (1) limited financial gain; and (2) run like a business. Much like the longitudinal study by 634 Levison et al. (2007), farm operators preferred child labour over adult labour for the reasons 635 outlined previously in the paper. The pressure to be profitable starts high up the hierarchical 636 value chain and creates a systematic interaction of influencers that directly, or indirectly, 637 promotes the use of child labour to increase profit and return. Additionally, limited financial 638 639 resources at the organisational level also enabled the reliance on child labour. India being a 640 Less Economically Developed Country (LEDC) focusses on income generation via export of goods (United Nations, 2014). Thus, Central Government is committed to export, leading to a 641 public policy agenda of open competition between states to attract businesses. Consequently, 642 GJ, among other states, sanctioned large areas of land for cottonseed production at low 643 production costs. Financial constraints in LEDCs also have a negative impact on labour rights 644 laws and policies (Blanton, Blanton and Peksen, 2015). Coercion and control took the forms of 645 646 emotional control and social isolation. Working long hours in isolated locations perpetuates 647 these forms of control as does the absence of a functional workers' union resulting in limited abilities to protect rights, and create fairer work environments (Tyler, 2015). 648

When child exploitation is identified, the focus is on establishing the root cause and redesigning normative standards in public and private policies. However, it is important to note that root cause analysis alone and the reactive processes associated with it will not address system level faults in socio-political economies (Lebaron *et al.*, 2018). In order to design effective policies that are based on a 'work as done' philosophy (Hollnagel, 2014) it is the important to assess agri-food value chains and the associated regulatory framing as a whole and in a holistic, 655 proactive manner. A better understanding of the mediating role of stakeholder attitudes in global food supply chains is needed alongside discrete audit tools to assess labour welfare in 656 agriculture value chains. As a result of situational and organisational factors such as time 657 pressure, availability of resources, workload, incentives/motivation and competition, 658 stakeholders demonstrate varying degrees of policy compliance in complex sociotechnical 659 systems (Bates & Holroyd, 2012; Manning et al. 2017; Humaidi & Balakrishnan, 2018). As has 660 been shown in these case studies, external influences such as political and financial factors 661 destabilise these systems leading to adaption and change. Maintaining control and delivering 662 compliance during continual changes is thus a dynamic process involving the entire 663 sociotechnical system (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). 664

665 The study highlights the impact of human interactions with their internal and external environments. The findings suggest that it is vital to analyse human, organisational and 666 government factors leading to the use of illegal and forced child labour from a systems lens 667 while designing public and private policies. Adopting such an approach helps to identify the 668 669 multiple causal factors and gain an in-depth insight into the functioning of agri-food value chains. A strong 'compliance and vigilance' culture combining system standards, audits, legal 670 actions, formation of vigilance committees and strengthening of grievance committees is 671 needed to reduce and eliminate the illegal practices and child labour incidents (Mishra, 2001; 672 Skrivankova, 2014). However, whether a strict "citizenship oriented" model of regulatory 673 compliance (Feldman, 2011) would be a plausible and reliable approach in maintaining 674 compliance by stakeholders amidst multiple socio-political pressures across hierarchical levels 675 is still open to debate. 676

677 **8.** Conclusion

678 Systematic analysis of the 2003/04 and 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents and comparison
679 with Rasmussen's framework highlights the complexity of causal factors and the importance of

designing relevant policies based on 'work-as-done' rather than 'work-as-imagined' when 680 681 developing public and private normative standards especially where there is a motive to protect multi-stakeholder self-interest in the exploitation of child labour. Non-compliance with 682 normative standards with a focus on generating profit, was a major issue identified at the 683 operational management and organisational levels. This combined with a lack of opacity, 684 transparency, and integrity within the governance of labour supply chain across government, 685 organisational and operational management levels. Indeed, external factors such as commercial 686 pressures and NGOs focussing on different State Governments and locations put the entire 687 system in the state of GJ under greater pressure, leading to wider exploitation. A lack of 688 689 positively orientated shared values, attitudes, perceptions and behaviours of stakeholders 690 combined with a lack of motivation to protect labour standards at the level of "work as done" means such exploitative practices will continue, even proliferate. The work described in this 691 692 paper describes one methodological approach to assessing this issue, however, more empirical 693 research needs to be carried out in this field of enquiry. The authors also acknowledge that the methodology adopted in this paper has several limitations, one of which is the dangers 694 associated with hindsight bias, which is the tendency to exaggerate the predictability of 695 696 outcomes after they have become known (Fessel, Epstude and Roese, 2009). Knowing the 697 outcome of events can distort any predictive judgements made on historic data and, the authors have been careful to not make any such predictions in the paper. The study does identify 698 limitations and flaws associated with designing policies based on a "work-as-imagined" 699 700 philosophy and demonstrates how the use of maturity modelling can explore how exploitation, corruption and organised crime is framed, and becomes more formalised over time. 701

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939 Table 1: Statutes within the Constitution of India that are designed to protect child labour and their welfare

940 Adapted from Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare (2020)

Act	Objective
The Payment of Wages Act, 1936	Avoid unnecessary delay in payment of wages, and prevent unauthorised deductions from wages
	(Government of India, 1936).
The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948	Provide details regarding self-financing social security and health insurance for Indian workers
	(Employees' State Insurance Corporation, 1948).
The Minimum Wages Act, 1948	Indian labour law that sets the minimum living wage for skilled and unskilled labourers
-	(Government of India, 1948).
The Contract Labour (Regulation and	Prevent exploitation of contract labour and introduce better conditions of work. Contract labour
Abolition) Act, 1970	hired through a contractor (middle-man) is considered to be 'indirect employees (Government of
	India, 1970).
The Bonded Labour System (Abolition)	Prohibit the practice of forced labour and human trafficking (Government of India, 1976a).
Act, 1976	
The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976	Payment of equal rates of remuneration to men and women workers (Government of India, 1976b).
The Inter-State Migrant Workmen	Regulate the condition of service of inter-state labourers and protect workers whose services are
(Regulation of Employment and	required outside their native states in India (Government of India, 1979).
Conditions of Service) Act, 1979	
The Child Labour (Prohibition and	Detailed regulations and guidance regarding working conditions and requirements (number of
Regulation) Act, 1986	hours, health and safety requirements, log books, holiday entitlement) for children under 15 in
	certain employment fields (Government of India, 1986).
The Unorganised Workers Social Security	Provides social security and welfare to workers of the unorganised sectors, i.e., daily-wage
Act, 2008	workers, self-employed workers or home-based workers) (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2008).

942 Table 2: Steps used to construct the Accimaps

943 Adapted from Branford *et al.* (2009)

Step number	Details
1	Large sheet of paper divided into multiple sections, with the headings of the various levels on the left-hand side.
2	Each incident analysed separately and the negative outcomes to be analysed are identified. Outcomes inserted into
	'Labourers' level of the Accimap.
3	List of causal factors drawn out. Causal factors are those factors, which if prevented, would have avoided the negative ever
4	Appropriate level for each causal factor identified based on guidelines provided by Branford et al. (2009).
5	Identified causal factors were written down on a sticky note and placed at the appropriate level on the sheet of paper.
6	Causal links were inserted, linking factors and demonstrating systemic errors.
7	Using Microsoft Visio, the factors were rearranged such that causes leading to the same outcome(s) in the 'Labourers' leve were placed close to each other.

Table 3: Conceptual dimensions central to understanding how modern slavery offences manifest

948 Adapted from Cooper et al. (2017)

Dimension	Maturity descriptor (Stage)	Factor/Outcome Identification Number for 2003/04 incidents	Factor/Outcome Identification Number for 2014/15 incidents
<u>Recruitment</u> Refers to methods which coerce or	Offenders target very vulnerable victims (1.1)	30	36; O6; O7; O9
deceive victims into forced labour and slavery.	Offenders offer opportunities to victims (1.2)	32; 37	36; 06
Profit	Victims approach offenders (1.3) No financial gain (2.1)	07	36
Extent of profit driven exploitation of slavery.	Limited financial gain (2.2)	27	22; 24; 27; 31; 32; O5; O15
1	Run like a business (2.3)	3; 6; 8; 15; 16; 20; 22; 23; 29; 33; 09	6; 8; 16; 22; 31; 32; 37; O5; O15
<u>Organisation of</u> <u>criminal activity</u>	No/minimal organisation (3.1)	25	
Extent of involvement of organised crime in	Some organisation (3.2)	19; 21; 24	7; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 19; 33; 35
the exploitation of slaves.	Highly organised (3.3)	25; 06	13; 14; 18; 20; 34; O13
<u>Control & Coercion</u> Methods of control	Repeated violence (4.1)		
used by offenders during the exploitation of victims.	Threats and occasional violence (4.2) Substance (4.3)	34; O1	23; 28; 29; 38; O1; O12; O14
	Financial (4.4)	31; 35; 36; O1; O2; O5	23; 28; 29; 38; 39; O12; O8
	Emotional (4.5)	26; 31; 34; 35; O2; O5	23; 28; 08
	Social isolation (4.6)	01; 04	01; 011; 014

Factor identification number	Interpretation
1	Commercial pressure to produce influenced stakeholders across two levels - organisational and central government. While the central government had made a
	commitment to improve national economy, seed companies had been awarded contracts by national and central governments to deliver output. There is also the added ris
	of the contract being rescinded and being awarded to a rival business.
2	Global news on the extensive use of child labour in Andhra Pradesh led to local NGOs focussing their attention solely on one state.
3	In an attempt to improve the national economy, the central government had made a commitment to export.
4	The central government let local governments compete with each other to get transnational and national seed companies to establish in their states.
5	The Indian Ceiling Act prohibits companies and individuals from owning large pieces of land.
6	In order to tempt seed businesses to establish themselves in GJ (and to outcompete other states), large pieces of land were sanctioned for seed production.
7	Inadequate policies regarding farm operational procedures and sales of public seeds.
8	Cheaper labour, energy and higher subsidies were offered to tempt businesses to establish themselves in GJ.
9	Inspectors from the state government failed to carry out audits of labour agreements signed by labourers and middle-men.
10	Inspectors from the state government failed to carry out audits of farms and working conditions.
11, 12 and 13	The government did not ensure that there were an adequate number of high-quality schools providing education to children.
14	Budget was re-allocated to other departments which were deemed to be more important.
15	Illegally produced GM crops generated higher income due to cheaper resourced that went in growing them.
16	Seed businesses relocated to GJ due to favourable conditions for businesses.
17	Seed businesses contracted their work out to local farmers and local labour, who they were dependent on to successfully compete in the value chain.
18	Seed businesses provided limited economic, raw material and training resources to farmers.
19	Seed businesses made agreements with middle-men to hire farmers who would grow cotton seeds and supply seeds back to the businesses.
20	Seed businesses did not want to negotiate the price they would pay for seeds (which they would purchase from the farmers), or the price of raw materials provided to farmers (to grow seeds).
21	Seed businesses provided and advance to middle-men to be able to hire farmers who could in-turn hire labourers.
22	The demand for illegally produced GM crops from seed companies meant that farmers felt the need to grow such crops.
23	Farmers relied on migrant labour due to the unavailability of labour within the farm.
24	The seasonality of the work meant that farmers needed access to assured continued supply of labour to meet the high demand.
25	Farmers made agreements with 'labour middle-men' to provide cheap labour that would help produce cottonseeds.
26	According to the contract signed by the labourers, farmers had the right to call labourers to work at any point during the season.
27	Farmers were meant to provide adequate housing for labourers who lived on their farms. However, they did not do so.
28	Farmers had access to limited resources (financial and raw materials).
29	Farmers preferred child labour as easy to control (make them carry out multiple tasks with minimal resistance), and their smaller and gentler hands.
30	Middle-men targeted under-privileged families as it was easier to make them sign unfavourable contracts.
31	Through pre-signed agreements, middle-men made agreements in advance with labourers about pay, and obtain illegal commission from labourers' pay.
32	Middle-men hired labourers from the same village that they were from.
33	Based on earlier illegal agreements, middle-men collected a commission from the labourers' pay.
34	Middle-men were given the authority to supervise labour on farms (although they had no training to do so).
35	As most labourers were illiterate, agreements were signed by middle-men.
36	Middle-men withheld labourers' wages if they did not do as they were told (i.e., work over time/send their children to work).
37	Families were promised extra wages for making their children go to work as labourers.

Table 4: Explanation of the numbered factors in Figure 2.


Table 5: Explanation of the numbered causal factors in Figure 3.


Factor identification number	Interpretation
1, 2 and 3	The system and its stakeholders over-relied on NGOs, the media and social investors to identify and eliminate occurrences of child labour. This lead to a culture of complacency and denial by various stakeholders when external stakeholders did not highlight occurrences of child labour.
4	Lack of unity towards what should have been a common goal of abolishing child labour. Most stakeholders shared common goal of generating profits (for a multitude of reasons) generating profit the expense of labour and child welfare was deemed the preferred route.
5	Over-reliance on media by the entire country (India) as a means of helping identify occurrences of illegal child labour meant that various media outlets were unable to focus on a couple of cases in detail.
6, 8 and 16	Governments as well as the private sector had a common goal of generating profits this was the leading and sole driver behind their operations.
7, 10, 11, 12 and 18	Public policies at the government levels and private policies at the organisational level all mentioned statement and principles of actions to mitigate the use of child labour on farms and within supply chains. However, these policies were designed based on 'work-as-imagined' instead of considering what actually happens within supply chains
9	Central government let local governments compete with each other to get transnational and national seed companies to establish in their states.
13, 14 and 19	Existence of illegal child labour was largely denied at the government level. A reason given when proof of child labour was provided was that children often worked around school hours or during holidays to help out their parents. However, this would still be a violation of international and national conventions as this action would hinder the child's ability to develop social skills and meet their educational needs.
15 and 25	Inspectors from the state government and private auditors failed to carry out audits of farms and working conditions.
19 unu 25 17	State Government failed to provide adequate support to labourers and seed producers due to inadequate resources and denial of the existence of child labour.
20 and 21	Large transnational and national seed companies promised to not use child labour within their supply chains. However, by loaning farms to poverty-stricken labourers, and by making them sign contracts they indirectly forced them to use their own children as a source of labour. They also designed policies that were ambiguous to help achieve their goals through any means necessary.
22	Transnationals relocated to tribal areas to avoid media pressure and then migrant and tribal labourers signed unscrupulous deals.
23, 28, 29 and 38	TNCs and local seed producers worked together to make poverty-stricken, migrant and tribal labourers sign unscrupulous deals whereby they would be bonded to work for these stakeholders for a long time with no option to opt-out, making the most of these labourers being illiterate.
26	In an attempt to generate greater profits, labourers who worked on farmers' farms were forced to work under conditions that would have been illegal under The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
27	As in the 2003/04 incidents, farmers preferred employing children as they were: cheaper to hire; easier to control; and had finer, small hands for carrying out the jobs required in cottonseed farms.
30	Farmers, local seed producers and labourers lacked knowledge about various legal rights, the existence of unions, and conditions that needed to be met to be able to hire workers. The acts carried out at this level were mostly due to what stakeholders higher up the hierarchical chain had advised.
31, 32 and 35	The sole goal of labour contractors was to earn money through both legal and illegal means. Lack of audits and resources, coupled with labourers' lack of knowledge made it easier for labour contractors to carry out illegal tasks such as not provide adults their minimum wage, leading to employment of child labour.
33, 37 and 39	Labour contractors were motivated to hire child labour due to the above-mentioned incentives, and also because it was easier to withhold their wages and collect illegal commissions from children.
34 and 36	Labour contractors trafficked migrants to work on farms (not subsistence farms) and targeted underprivileged families as it was easier to carry out unethical practices such as manipulation into working for pre-signed contracts and withholding of wages.

953 Figure 1: The structure of a sociotechnical food/feed system

Adapted from Rasmussen (1997)

955





957 Figure 2: Accimap diagram of the 2003/04 Gujarat child labour incidents

959 Figure 3: Accimap diagram of the 2014/15 Gujarat child labour incidents




Figure 4: Maturity stages of the causal factors and outcomes related to the 2003/04 illegal child labour incidents in Gujarat




Figure 5: Maturity stages of the causal factors and outcomes related to the 2014/15 illegal child labour incidents in Gujarat

